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Abstract 
 
This paper documents the developments in the WTO negotiations from Doha to present 
day, in the context of substantive work programme on special and differential treatment 
(S&D) for developing countries. From the evidence so far, the current round of trade 
negotiations, the Doha Development Round does not yet deserve the epithet of a 
“development round”. Developed countries have relegated on their promises to redress 
the imbalances—including the challenges faced by poor countries and the inequities 
generated by previous rounds of trade negotiations. The Doha Round has failed to deliver 
on S&D. No substantial progress has been made in strengthening the S&D proposals and 
making them more precise, effective and operational as mandated in Doha. It appears 
developed countries are likely to be more amendable to agree to more operational, 
meaningful and binding S&D provided there is clarity on who, the beneficiaries are. 
Developing countries need to have a very honest discussion (among themselves) on issue 
of differentiation and graduation. Given that economic and social conditions vary across 
countries, one option would be to tailor different types of S&D measures to specific 
circumstances and needs of developing countries on the basis of their levels of 
development. 
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1 Introduction  
 
Development issues have gained the centre stage of multilateral trade negotiations since 
the November 2001 Ministerial declaration in Doha, Qatar which launched the Doha 
Development Round. The declaration provides a mandate for negotiations on a range of 
areas in support of development, spanning the negotiations on special and differential 
treatment (S&D) for developing countries; implementation-related issues and concerns; 
technical assistance and capacity building; and unique challenges faced by least developed 
countries (LDCs) and small economies as well as negotiations on agriculture; non 
agriculture market access (NAMA); services; trade-related aspects of intellectual property 
(TRIP); Rules (anti-dumping, subsidies and countervailing measures—SCM); trade 
facilitation; regional trade agreement; trade and environment and dispute settlement 
understanding. This broad approach ensures that development issues are considered in all 
the areas being negotiated, reaffirmed by the Decision adopted by the General Council on 
1 August 2004 (July Package) and Hong Kong Declaration. 
The incorporation of development issues in all core areas of multilateral trade 
negotiations is out of realisation that market failures are pervasive and that any path to 
economic development and integration of poor counties into the world economy requires a 
multifaceted approach and liberal dose of differential policy towards developing countries. 
It was widely felt that that S&D on its own is an inadequate instrument to facilitate 
integration of developing countries and least-developed Members into the multilateral 
trading system. It needed to be part of a broader framework that put the fundamental 
interests of developing countries at the fore—securing a more effective market access and 
fair trade conditions for their exports, capacity building, balanced rules and good 
governance in the WTO as well as ensuring resources for development support (e.g. to help 
relieve supply-side constraints), and the policy interventions needed towards 
competitiveness, diversification and productive sector development.  
Thus, the inception of Special and differential (S&D) treatment provisions for 
developing countries (emphasized in the Uruguay Round), and other related provisions—
supportive of development issues—was a recognition that the rules-based multilateral 
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trading system requires a development dimension. That is, one that addresses the 
requirements and special needs of the weaker member states, including avenues for 
poverty reduction, growth, welfare and development that work for all members 
(beneficiaries) of the global trade system. The inception of Doha ‘Development Round’ 
was encouraging sign of shared responsibility for the challenges faced by poor countries 
and the perceived inequities generated by previous rounds of trade negotiations. The WTO 
Members felt that multilateral trading system had failed to provide anticipated benefits to 
majority of developing countries. Share in global trade of the 49 poorest countries fell from 
0.8 percent in 1980 to 0.4 percent in 1999, as areas of export interest to developing 
countries faced face high tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Inequality widened between 
developed and developing countries, making it even more difficult to anticipate integration 
of developing countries particularly the least developed among them, into the multilateral 
trading system.  
In view of these concerns, the nations of the world agreed in Doha to put development 
at the centre of multilateral trade negotiations (to redress some of the imbalances of the 
past). The Doha Ministerial Declaration (in Doha Qatar in November 2001) set out an 
ambitious agenda; Members committed themselves to reduce agricultural trade barriers; 
improve non-agricultural market access; make special and differential treatment provisions 
more effective, precise and operational; and improve rules on TRIPS/ public health, anti-
dumping, dispute settlement; among others things.   
This paper traces this journey from Doha to present day, to help us understand the 
substantive work programme on special and differential treatment (S&D) in the WTO 
since 2001. Beginning with the major decision taken in Doha, it reviews the progress made 
in the implementation of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) work programme on 
special and differential treatment, including how the process of operationalisation or 
improving effectiveness of S&D has been conducted in the WTO. It asks, have S&D 
provisions fulfilled their objectives? How can they be made more precise, effective and 
operational? It examines major elements of the upcoming work on S&D, and the 
systematic and institutional cross-cutting issues relating to the functioning of the S&D, 
including: 
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(i) reviewing various S&D provisions prior to and following the Doha Declaration; 
(ii) identifying the difficulties that prevent developing countries from maximizing the 
benefits from use and implementation of S&D provisions;   
(iii) identifying S&D provisions that have not been reviewed, and also those where 
the review has been problematic; 
(iv) indicating how S&D provisions can enhance the participation of developing 
countries in trade negotiations and assist them in implementing their WTO 
obligations; and 
(v) presenting proposals for the improvement of S&D treatment in the ongoing and 
future negotiations in the WTO. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The next section addresses the need 
for a development round. It examines some elements of the experience of developing 
countries in previous trade negotiations. Section three and four examine the substantive 
work programme on special and differential treatment (S&D) in the WTO since 2001, 
beginning with a review of the major decision taken in Doha—and progress in the 
operationalisation or improving effectiveness of S&D, and section five concludes.  
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 2 The need for a development round  
 
At the 1999 Geneva conference on the WTO and the developing countries, Joseph Stiglitz, 
the then Vice President of the World Bank, proposed that the next round of WTO 
negotiations be labeled the “Development Round”. This direction was reinforced by Mike 
Moore who was Director General of the WTO at that time. In Doha (Qatar), November 
2001, the nations of the world agreed to a new round of trade negotiations that would 
redress some of the imbalances of the past—the Doha Development Round.1 
This section takes a step back from the Doha Round and examines some elements of 
development issues particularly, special and differential treatment (S&D) provisions for 
developing countries and the experience of developing countries in previous trade 
negotiations. 
 
2.1 Special and differential treatment provisions for developing countries  
 
Special and differential treatment (S&D) for developing countries in the multilateral 
trading system refers to special rights granted to developing countries with respect to their 
obligations under the GATT and WTO. It includes measures to meet their trade and 
development needs, on account of their disadvantaged position vis-à-vis their developed 
trading partners. S&D finds expression in 145 provisions in Uruguay agreements—spread 
across different disciplines, including Agreements on Trade in Goods; the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property; the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes; the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services; and in various Ministerial Decisions.  
In 1964 the GATT adopted a specific legal framework to address the concerns of 
developing countries. Three new Articles, XXXVI to XXXVIII were introduced in Part IV 
of GATT dealing specifically with Trade and Development. Part IV of GATT 
                                                 
1 See Hertel, Thomas, W ; Preckel, Paul ,V; Cranfield, John A.L. and Ivanic, Maros. “Poverty 
impacts of multilateral trade liberalization”, GTAP Working Paper # 16 
A PRIMER ON DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE WTO 5 
 
 5 
encompasses the new principle that reciprocity in the rounds of multilateral trade 
negotiations should be limited to whatever is consistent with the development needs of 
developing countries (Article XXXVI). The measures introduced included, (1) provision of 
more favourable market access conditions to products of export interest to developing 
countries, (2) introduction of the concept of non-reciprocity; (3) elimination of restrictions 
which differentiate unreasonably between primary and processed products, (4) 
establishment of the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) to review the 
application of Part IV and to consider any changes to these provisions to strengthen the 
objectives of trade and development.   
These underlying conceptual premises resulted in 155 S&D provisions in the Uruguay 
Round agreement, which include provisions 
a) aimed at increasing trade opportunities (there are altogether 12 such provisions);  
b) which urge WTO Members to safeguard the interest of developing countries, 
especially while using trade remedies (49); 
c) offering flexibility of commitments (30);  
d) offering transitional time periods (18); 
e) related to technical assistance (14); 
f) in favour of least developed countries (22). 
 
In 1979 (the end of Tokyo Round) a Framework Agreement was negotiated that 
included the so-called Enabling Clause - officially called Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries. 
Enabling Clause provides for departures from Most Favoured Nations (MFN) principles 
and other GATT rules, but also gives permanent legal cover for operation of the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) established under the auspices of the UNCTAD. 
Enabling Clause codified principles, practices, and procedures regarding the use of trade 
measures by developing countries, giving developing countries relatively “more” 
flexibility in applying trade measures to meet their “essential development needs.” 
Enabling Clause is the legal basis for most the existing S&D provisions in the different 
WTO agreements, which formed the core of the ‘development dimension’ of the 
multilateral trading system. 
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2.2 What objectives were S&D meant to achieve?  
 
First, the objective of S&D was not clearly defined in GATT and still remains unclear 
today. Members feel that the S&D provisions were to enable greater participation or 
integration of developing countries into the multilateral trading system. It was recognized 
that developing countries lacked the institutional strength to manage the full weight of 
WTO rules. Moreover, they might well find the returns to building the necessary capacity 
outweighed by the costs. They also lacked the resources to overcome natural obstacles to 
trade or to pursue policies to address market failures. 
During the Uruguay Round (1986–1993), developing countries were trying to defend 
their growing trade interests. They faced a number of challenges concerning access for 
their exports to developed country markets. Among other things, these challenges in 
developed country markets included increased discrimination through higher tariffs on 
products of export interest to developing countries, proliferation of restraints on exports in 
textiles and clothing, lack of adequate disciplines in agriculture, use of grey area measures 
(that is, voluntary export restraints and orderly marketing arrangements that were imposed 
on developing countries bilaterally by major developed countries). At the same time, 
developing countries desired to have S&D provisions that would adequately take into 
account their development objectives. 
However, maintaining the flexibility that developing countries had enjoyed before the 
Uruguay Round through S&D treatment became increasingly difficult in view of the rising 
levels of growth in a number of developing countries, the growing gap among developing 
countries, and the increasing pressure exerted by developed countries for reciprocal 
obligations and concessions from developing countries. This was exacerbated by the rising 
level of obligations that some developing countries came to accept in reciprocal regional 
trade agreements.2 
                                                 
2 This trend continued with the establishment of free trade areas with high levels of commitments and 
progressive liberalization that was accepted by developing countries in free trade areas with developed 
countries, such as in the case of Mexico in NAFTA and, of developing countries in the Mediterranean 
region with the European Union. 
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Another issue of great concern to developing countries during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations was that of the erosion of preferential tariff margins granted to developing 
country exports under the GSP schemes. Such erosion was an inevitable consequence of 
the reduction of the overall level of tariffs under the Uruguay Round. It is not clear 
whether this concern has led to any gains in dealing with S&D provisions or in 
negotiations in other areas.  
In June 1993, the Uruguay Round was finally brought to a close (the Round started in 
1986). Part of the drive for members to conclude the Uruguay Round was the promise of 
large welfare gains that many researchers had projected. In 1992–93 the World Bank, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and a few other 
institutions estimated that conclusion of the round would lead to global welfare gains on 
the order of $200 billion a year; with about one-third of the total gains, that is, up to $90 
billion going to developing countries (OECD 1993). 
  
2.3 Did S&D achieve its objectives?  
 
If the question is about how it has helped developing countries to integrate into the 
multilateral trading system, the answer is certainly no. However, if the question about 
S&D is whether it has been able to provide some flexibility to developing countries, the 
answer is a qualified yes.    
Let’s look at the first question. Incidentally, the papers by Hindley (1987) and Wolf 
(1984), which were written as countries were preparing to launch the Uruguay Round, had 
predicted that many of the policies that are permitted by the GATT/WTO would be 
ineffective or inefficient.  
In aftermath of Uruguay Round, S&D increasingly became perceived as an ineffective 
instrument. It had not delivered what it was supposed to: greater participation of 
developing countries in the multilateral trading system (Wolf, 1984; Whalley, 1999). Only 
about 25 countries (among them, Malaysia, Brazil, China, Hungry, India, Mexico, and 
Thailand) have been able to break into the global markets – and substantially increased 
their ratio of trade to income over the last two decades. As mentioned earlier, share in 
global trade of the 49 poorest countries fell from 0.8 percent to 0.4 percent between 1980 
and 1999, accompanied by widening inequality between the rich and poor countries.  
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The World Bank and OECD’s estimates on the gains of the Uruguay Round—
particularly the estimates for developing countries—were overly optimistic.3 One reason 
why the projections did not materialize, according to some commentators, was that the 
modeled scenarios were detached from actual events.4 A number of reforms did not 
proceed as envisaged early in the negotiations such as the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing (ATC) and liberalizing agricultural market access. These were the major sources 
of predicted gains. ATC was structured to significantly backload liberalization, the ability 
of tariff-rate quotas to liberalize agricultural market access was overestimated, and the 
costs of implementation were largely ignored. 
The Uruguay Round agenda reflected, in large measure, the priorities of developed 
countries. Market access gains, for example, were concentrated in areas of special interest 
to developed countries. Only marginal progress was made on the priorities of developing 
countries, especially in agriculture and textiles. This imbalance is reflected in the Uruguay 
Round outcomes. Specific concerns of developing countries remained unaddressed - 
affecting their economic development and integration into the multilateral trading system. 
After the implementation of Uruguay commitments, the average OECD tariff on imports 
from developing countries was four times higher than the tariff on goods originating in the 
OECD countries (Laird 2002). Domestic protection (particularly agricultural subsidies) 
also remained much higher in developed countries, amounting to more than $300 billion in 
2002. Producers in the poorest developing countries were most affected by the OECD 
protectionist policies. 
Martin and Winters (1995) observe that though the Agreement on Agriculture achieved 
a great deal in terms of defining rules for agricultural trade, it achieved little in terms of 
immediate market access. Indeed, the level of OECD farm protection was not significantly 
reduced. In 1986–88 transfers were equivalent to 51 percent of all OECD farm production. 
Fourteen (14) years later, after the implementation of Uruguay Round commitments, they 
accounted for 48 percent of all farm production (roughly $320 billion) (OECD 2003). 
Trade-distorting measures of industrial nations displace the agricultural exports of 
                                                 
3 UNDP found that 70 percent of the gains of the Uruguay Round would go to industrial countries, with most of 
the rest going to a relatively few large export-oriented developing countries. It also found  that the round would 
leave many of the poorest countries in the world worse off (UNDP 1997). 
4 See Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton—A report prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat by 
the Initiative Policy Dialogue (IPD) in collaboration with the IPD Task Force on Trade Policy. 
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developing countries. By suppressing world prices, these policies have a direct effect on 
farm incomes.5   
In nonagricultural goods (NAMA), developed countries maintain high import barriers 
on many of the goods exported most intensively by developing countries. When weighted 
by import volumes, developing countries face average manufacturing tariffs of 3.4 percent 
on their exports to developed countries—more than four times the 0.8 percent average 
tariff they impose on goods imported from developed countries (Hertel and Martin 2000). 
Moreover, aggregate data hide tariff peaks. In the United States post–Uruguay Round tariff 
rates on more than half of textile and clothing imports are 15–35 percent. In Japan, 22 
percent of textile imports face tariffs of 10–15 percent (UNCTAD 1996). Tariffs on fully 
processed food are 65 percent in Japan, 42 percent in Canada, and 24 percent in the 
European Union. By contrast, tariffs on the least processed products are just 3 percent in 
Canada, 15 percent in the European Union, and 35 percent in Japan (World Bank 2002). 
Such tariff peaks are manifestly unfair and have a particularly pernicious effect on 
development by restricting industrial diversification in the poorest countries. 
Whereas developing countries received a small share of the gains from the Uruguay 
Round, they accepted a remarkable range of obligations and responsibilities. New trade 
rules and domestic discipline were introduced, but they reflected the priorities and needs of 
developed countries more than developing countries’. For instance, subsidies were 
permitted for agriculture but not industrial products. Many of the rules limited developing 
countries’ policy options, in some cases prohibiting the use of instruments that had been 
employed by developed countries at comparable stages of their development.  
Many of the new obligations imposed significant burdens on developing countries. In 
return, the least developed countries were promised financial assistance with 
implementation costs and extensions of preferential market access schemes. However, 
these commitments were nonbinding, leaving developing countries at the mercy of the 
goodwill of developed countries. As Finger and Schuler (2000, p.514) aptly put it, “The 
developing countries took bound commitments to implement in exchange for unbound 
commitments of assistance.” Implementing the Uruguay Round placed on developing 
                                                 
5 Estimates of the downward impact on world prices caused by OECD domestic support are 3.5–5.0 percent for 
many agricultural commodities, including wheat and other coarse grains and oilseeds (Dimaranan, Hertel, and 
Keeney 2003). 
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countries enormous demands, particularly with regard to intellectual property, customs 
valuation, technical barriers to trade, and agricultural food safety. Many developing 
countries have been unable to meet their Uruguay Round obligations because of these high 
implementation costs.6 
After the Uruguay Round, the general view was that the TRIPS agreement needed to be 
reviewed, particularly in its application to public health.7 Many developing countries felt 
that the agreement as it stood purely reflected intellectual property rights protection in 
favour of developed countries, in disregard of the realities in developing countries. The 
benefits of GSP have declined for other reasons too, including the increased use of non-
tariff measures (NTMs) in GSP schemes, additional conditionalities that are imposed by 
preference-giving countries and the unpredictability of the system.8 However, priority 
consideration should be given to how to make the best use of the present GSP schemes and 
how these schemes can be improved in practical ways for the benefit of developing 
countries. 
The results of the Uruguay Round reflect the balance of power and capabilities 
prevailing during negotiations.  From a developing country perspective, more could have 
been achieved. This is also the case with regard to the S&D provisions, which could also 
have been better formulated and made more precise and effective. The next section reviews 
the major decisions taken in Doha with respect to S&D provisions and progress so far in 
implementing those decisions.  
                                                 
6 By January 2000, up to 90 of the WTO’s 109 developing country members were in violation of sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards, customs valuation, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS). Estimates of the cost of complying with the Uruguay agreements vary widely, 
depending on the quality of each country’s existing systems and the strength of its institutions. Hungary spent 
more than $40 million upgrading sanitary conditions in its slaughterhouses. Mexico spent more than $30 
million upgrading its intellectual property laws. Finger (2000) suggests that for many of the least developed 
countries in the WTO, compliance with these agreements is a less attractive investment than expenditure on 
basic development goals, such as education.  
7 Article 71.1 provides for a review of the implementation of the agreement after 2000 and for possible reviews “in 
the light of any relevant new developments which might warrant modification or amendment.” 
8 The GSP is granted by developed countries on a unilateral, voluntary and non-binding basis. They can 
amend, modify or withdraw benefits unilaterally and at any time. 
A PRIMER ON DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE WTO 11 
 
 11 
3 The DDA work programme on special and differential treatment  
 
After a few years of implementing S&D provisions, many developing countries 
accordingly felt that most of the S&D provisions are: non-binding, in the form of ‘best 
endeavour clauses’,  apparently mandatory, yet de-facto non-binding and only a few 
provisions are mandatory and binding provisions.  
Ministers at Doha, recognising that problems existed with respect to S&D treatment 
set out a work programme in para 44 of the declaration, which reaffirmed that SDT is an 
integral part of the WTO, (2) noted that there are concerns about the implementation of 
S&D provisions, (3) directed that all S&D provisions should be reviewed to strengthen 
them and to make them more precise, effective and operational 
Here, our aim is to understand the substantive work programme on special and 
differential treatment (S&D) in the WTO since 2001. This includes reviews of the major 
decision taken in Doha as well as how the process of operationalisation or improving 
effectiveness of S&D has been conducted in the WTO, and major elements of the 
upcoming work on S&D, the systematic and institutional cross-cutting issues relating to 
the functioning of the S&D.9 
  
3.1 Review of the major decisions taken in Doha  
The Doha Ministerial Declaration accorded special and differential treatment a central 
place in the current round of rule negotiations. It reaffirmed that “provisions for special 
and differential treatment are an integral part of the WTO Agreements” and directed that 
“all special and differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to 
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational” (WTO, 
                                                 
9 This section benefited from WTO TN/CTD/15 CTD Special Session 28 April 2006 Report to 
the Trade Negotiations Committee; TN/CTD/18 26 July 2006 Report to the General Council, 
TN/CTD/M/26 5 September 2006 Note to the Meeting on 7 July 2006; among other WTO 
resources. 
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2001: paragraph 44). The Doha ministerial also endorsed the Work Programme on 
special and differential treatment set out in the Decision on Implementation-Related 
Issues and Concerns (paragraph 12.1 of Doha declaration), and directed the Committee 
on Trade and Development to: 
 
 (1)   …“identify those special and differential treatment provisions that are 
already mandatory in nature and those that are non-binding in character, to consider the 
legal and practical implications for developed and developing Members of converting 
special and differential treatment measures into mandatory provisions, to identify those 
that Members consider should be made mandatory, and to report to the General Council 
with clear recommendations for a decision by July 2002; 
 
(2) …examine additional ways in which special and differential treatment 
provisions can be made more effective, to consider ways, including improved 
information flows, in which developing countries, in particular the least-developed 
countries, may be assisted to make best use of special and differential treatment 
provisions, and to report to the General Council with clear recommendations for a 
decision by July 2002; and 
 
(3) …consider, in the context of the Work Programme adopted at the Fourth Sessions 
of the Ministerial Conference, how special and differential treatment may be 
incorporated into the architecture of WTO rules.” 
Paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and paragraph 12.1 of the Decision 
on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns (reproduced above) provide the basis of 
the work that WTO Members have undertaken since the Doha Ministerial Conference.  
 
3.2 Elements of the work on S&D: from Doha to Hong Kong  
The Doha mandate was an opportunity for developing countries to push some of the S&D 
provisions closer to their original expectations, by strengthening them and making them 
more effective and operational – and if needs be, to change some ‘best-endeavour 
language’ into mandatory obligations. In 2001, the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) 
– the body responsible for overseeing the Doha Round negotiations – decided that the 
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mandate on special and differential treatment would be dealt with in Special Sessions of 
the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD).  
The Committee was expected to report to the General Council by 31 July 2002, “with 
clear recommendations for a decision,” on the review of “all special and differential 
treatment provisions … with a view to strengthening them and making them more 
precise, effective and operational.” As virtually no recommendations were ready for 31 
July 2002, the General Council instructed the Special Session to “proceed expeditiously 
to fulfil its mandate” and report to the General Council “with clear recommendations for 
a decision by 31 December 2002.” The deadline was extended a second time to 10 
February 2003 (Figure 1), but Members were unable to agree on any “recommendations 
for a decision” by that time. Why? 
 
 
November 2001: Ministers directed 
that all S&D provisions be reviewed 
with a view of making them more 
effective, precise and operational  
Report to the GC with 
clear recommendations 
for a decision by July 
2002  
 
Figure 1. Timeline 
for S&D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deadline for review of 
S&D extended to 31 
December 2002 
 
 
Deadline for review of 
S&D provisions extended 
to 10 February 2003 
 
2006 – December 
2006: Expected 
date for completion 
of round 
July Package:  Decision 
adopted by the GC to 
complete review of S&D 
as soon as possible 
 
2006 – Hong Kong Ministerial: 
Complete review of category II 
proposal as soon as possible for 
decision by December 2006 
July 2005: Complete review 
of all outstanding S&D as 
soon as possible 
 
   The Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development reported in its 
February 2003 report to the General Council that “an important area of difference has 
been the interpretation of some of the aspects of the Doha Mandate”. While Members 
appreciated the importance of the need to review all the S&D provisions (‘with the view 
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2003 
2005 2006 
2001 
14 3.2 Elements of the work on S&D: from Doha to Hong Kong 
 
 14 
to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational’) as 
mandated at Doha, there were considerable differences in opinion on how this could be 
achieved in practice.  
Some Members thought that one way to make S&D provisions more precise, effective 
and operational was to make them mandatory by changing the existing language of some 
of the ‘best endeavour’ provisions. That, doing so was part of the mandate. Others 
thought that amending the text of the Agreement had the danger of altering what they 
considered to be the existing balance of rights and obligations. Some delegations felt that 
such proposals would be best referred to negotiating bodies, while others doubted 
whether such action was consistent with the Doha Mandate. 
In May 2003, the Chair of the General Council circulated a list, which categorised the 
88 agreement-specific proposals put forward by developing countries.10  
Category I consisted of 38 proposals on which agreement was seen to be possible 
before Cancun, probably because they received most support from Members or they were 
considered to be most urgent. Category II comprised another 38 proposals that were sent 
to relevant WTO bodies in late May 2003. Category III included the 15 proposals on 
which Members had the most difficulty in finding consensus. Although the Special 
Session of the CTD considered many of the proposals, both in open-ended informal 
meetings and smaller plurilateral consultations, positions could not be bridged on most of 
them.  
 In the course of the work in the CTD Special Session and later in the General Council, 
Members finally agreed to make recommendations for possible adoption by Ministers in 
Cancun in 2003 on some of the 25 agreement-specific proposals. During consultations at 
Cancun, some developing countries were concerned about the value of these 
recommendations, contained in Annex C of the draft Ministerial text and had reiterated 
the view that the proposed package would be strengthened by the addition of some 
agreement-specific proposals. This led to inclusion of three additional recommendations 
in Annex C at Cancun, bringing the number to 28 agreement-specific recommendations 
in Annex C of the Cancun Draft Ministerial text. However, the failure of the Cancun 
                                                 
10 A total of 88 agreement specific proposals were made, mainly by the least-developed countries and 
the African Group. 
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Ministerial meant that the 28 recommendations were left un-adopted. Thus, these 28 still 
remains as an agreement in principle, until they are adopted by Members.     
The tone of the discussions also showed some differences of opinion on most cross-
cutting issues particularly, issues relating to the principles and objectives of special and 
differential treatment; a single or multi-tiered structure of rights and obligations; 
utilisation; and universal or differentiated treatment, including graduation. Some 
Members considered these issues as fundamental and insisted that they should be 
examined in greater depth. They said that better understanding on these issues would 
facilitate consensus on the agreement-specific proposals.   
However, others insisted that the principles and objectives of special and differential 
treatment were already provided in Part IV of GATT 1994 and doubted whether these 
issues were within the mandate of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. Some submitted that, 
in some cases, differentiation amongst developing countries would be necessary if S&D 
was to be made more effective and targeted. Others did not agree. 
 On the question of the definition of developing countries, there were those who felt 
that such a definition was necessary to make S&D more precise, effective and operational 
and to confer legal predictability and certainty regarding the beneficiaries. Majority 
however disagreed, saying that any attempt to differentiate amongst, or define a 
developing country was inconsistent with the Doha mandate.  
The slow progress resulted in the General Council in the 2004 July Package simply 
instructing the CTD Special Session to “expeditiously complete the review”- giving the 
Committee on Trade and Development Special Session a July 2005 deadline for 
completing its review of all outstanding agreement-specific proposals and reporting to the 
General Council “with clear recommendations for a decision”. Four deadlines for that 
report were missed since Doha to the run-up to Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. 
Several factors accounted for this slow progress. 
 
3.3 In the run up to the Hong Kong Ministerial  
Going by the discussions in the Special Session of the S&D and later in the General 
Council, by the deadline of July 2005 it appeared that developed countries were likely to 
be more amendable to agree to more operational, meaningful and binding S&D provided 
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there was clarity on who the beneficiaries are. S&D provisions are targeted and seek to 
alleviate specific problems and concerns. There is an indication of the time and/or level 
of economic development up to which S&D would be available; and there is an objective 
and clear criterion of graduation (the “Enabling Clause” included language on graduation 
– S&D policies were to be phased out as the recipient countries reached a certain level of 
economic development although criteria for this were not clearly defined). 
The impasse in the Doha-mandated special and differential treatment (S&D) 
negotiations stems from the polarisation of WTO Members around two concerns. The 
first is how to improve the development content of S&D and the second is the eligibility 
of developing countries to S&D benefits. It was increasingly becoming clear that any 
constructive solutions aimed at overcoming the deadlock must respond to both sets of 
concerns if the Doha-mandated S&D negotiations were to move forward. On the other 
hand, these solutions should be framed in broader considerations on mainstreaming 
development in the multilateral trading system.  
As presented in meetings in November and December 2004, Faizel Ismail had 
proposed to cluster the agreement-specific proposals on the basis of their motivations or 
"underlying issues". This approach attempted to overcome the disagreement between 
developed countries, who wanted more focus on cross-cutting issues, and developing 
countries, who wanted more emphasis on agreement-specific issues. However, a number 
of developing countries expressed concerns at the meeting that the approach gave undue 
emphasis on cross-cutting or "horizontal" issues and could introduce differentiation 
amongst developing countries. 
These concerns came to the forefront when a 6-7 April 2004 meeting of the CTD 
Special Session fell apart after Members were unable to agree to an agenda that allocated 
a full day, of a two day meeting, to cross-cutting issues. The agenda which was proposed 
at the meeting reportedly would have divided all the cross-cutting and agreement-specific 
proposals into two broad categories - flexibility and capacity building. The entirety of the 
April meeting would have focused on the proposals in the flexibility category and 
examined agreement-specific proposals on the first day and cross-cutting on the second 
day with a May meeting looking at capacity building proposals.  
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Several developing countries including India, Malaysia, Mexico, Colombia and Peru 
refused, saying that they had not been adequately consulted about this classification and 
expressed fears that structuring work along those lines would shift negotiations towards 
cross-cutting issues instead of ensuring that Members focus their attention on agreement-
specific proposals which, they said, had a stronger mandate to deliver by July and the 
Hong Kong ministerial under the Doha Declaration. As a result, they refused to accept 
the agenda and the meeting adjourned early. This return to the old dichotomy between the 
two types of proposals was a step backwards in the negotiations. 
Negotiations in the CTD Special Session in 2005 moved away from earlier debates on 
the relative priority to be given to agreement-specific proposals vis-à-vis cross-cutting 
issues and instead focused on agreement-specific proposals in the hopes of making 
concrete progress on the mandate given to the group in the run up to the Hong Kong 
Ministerial. At their first meeting on 9 February, Members decided to move forward on 
agreement specific proposals, with priority to be given to LDC proposals, while keeping 
Chair Faizel Ismail's proposed "situational flexibility" approach to the negotiations as a 
reference point.  
Following extensive consultations, however, meetings on 10 and 12 May 2005 forged 
ahead by looking at five agreement-specific proposals from LDCs with the understanding 
that Members could bring up cross-cutting issues as solutions to these proposals as 
appropriate. This was the first time that the agreement-specific proposals had been looked 
at in earnest by the group in the two years since the Cancun Ministerial. Members looked 
at proposal 22 and 23 (relating to Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations), 
38 (Enabling Clause), 84 (TRIMS Agreement), 88 (Measure in Favour of LDCs) and 36 
(Enabling Clause para. 3b). Members suggested that these proposals needed to be 
redrafted in order to update them after the July Package and other developments.  
A number of developed countries also added that LDCs could not expect to make no 
commitments or receive a perpetual blanket exemption, as the objective of WTO 
Membership was to integrate LDCs into the multilateral trading system at some point and 
LDCs retorted that their proposals intended to address the costs of implementation of 
WTO disciplines. In addition, during the meeting and during informal consultations 
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shortly afterwards, LDCs were encouraged to redraft the proposals in order to better 
address the underlying needs behind the proposals. 
At the meeting of the CTD Special Session on 16th and 17th June, 2005, LDCs 
presented new versions of its proposals but, owing to its late presentation, it did not 
receive immediate and complete reactions from Members. Sources suggested that the 
changes were largely cosmetic and that the proposals could still use work to make them 
clearer and ensure they address the stated needs of the proponents. Members also raised 
questions about the automaticity of some of the exemptions in the proposal and many 
opposed the blanket exemption from TRIMs disciplines in proposal No.84. The group 
proceeded to focus on these LDC proposals with an aim of having agreed text on at least 
four of them for the July 2005 deadline. However, the meeting did go on to look at all the 
remaining agreement-specific proposals where they suggested some revisions and, after 
looking at LDC proposals, considered taking these up at subsequent meetings.  
In late November 2005, Members agreed that their positions on key issues remained 
too far apart for the original goals of Hong Kong Ministerial Conference to be met. They 
had to find ways to ensure that momentum would not be lost post-Hong Kong, and an 
‘ambitious’ outcome could still be reached either by the end of 2006 or early in 2007. 
 
4 Post Hong Kong: Some developments and elements of the work on 
S&D  
 
At the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, Ministers reaffirmed that “provisions for 
special and differential treatment (S&D) are an integral part of the WTO Agreements” 
and renewed their determination “to fulfil the mandate contained in paragraph 44 of the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration and in the Decision adopted by the General Council on 1 
August 2004; namely, that all S&D provisions be reviewed with a view to strengthening 
them and making them more precise, effective and operational.” In this regard, the CTD 
Special Session was instructed to:11 
                                                 
11 TN/CTD/15 26 July 2006 Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development, Report by the 
Chairman, Ambassador Burhan Gafoor (Singapore), to the General Council  
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 expeditiously complete the review of all the outstanding Agreement-specific 
proposals and report to the General Council, with clear recommendations for a 
decision at the latest by December 2006; and 
 resume work on all other outstanding issues, including on the cross-cutting issues, the 
Monitoring Mechanism and the incorporation of S&D into the architecture of WTO 
rules and report on a regular basis to the General Council. 
 
In addition, the bodies in which the Category II proposals are being addressed were 
instructed to complete consideration of those proposals and report to the General Council, 
with the objective of ensuring that clear recommendations for a decision are made by 
December 2006.  In this regard, the Special Session has been directed to continue to 
coordinate its efforts with these bodies, so as to ensure that this work is completed on 
time.  
The Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development mentioned in its 26 
July 2006 report to the General Council that, since the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference, the Special Session has held four formal meetings – on 6 March, 7 April, 1 
June and 7 July 2006, and a number of informal plurilateral consultations.12 That, in these 
meetings and consultations, the Special Session have continued to focus the process on a 
text-based discussion of the 16 remaining Agreement-specific proposals (eight from 
Category I and eight from Category III), bearing in mind that the Committee was 
mandated by the Ministers at Hong Kong to make clear recommendations for a decision 
on these proposals by December 2006. 
Overall, since work began in February 2006, Members has made some progress on 
seven out of the remaining 16 Agreement-specific proposals (Table 1). The formal and 
informal consultations have led to revised texts on four of the proposals, three relating to 
Article 3.5 of the Agreement on Import Licensing and one proposal relating to 
Article XVIII of the GATT.  On two of the proposals relating to the SPS Agreement, 
informal discussions have continued on the basis of alternative texts proposed by some 
                                                 
12 e.g. informal group meeting on 5 July to continue work on some of the Agreement-specific proposals, in 
particular on proposal Nos. 24 and 25 and also proposal No. 79, all of which related to the Agreement on 
SPS.  The discussions on proposal Nos. 24 and 25 were based on earlier small group discussions that were 
held in May.   
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Members.  The report states that “while the revised language on these six (7) proposals 
provides a basis for further discussions, it is clear that work on these proposals is far from 
complete and further progress will require Members to show greater flexibility.”  
 
Table 1. Proposals on which substantial progress has been made 
 
Proposal 
Number  Progress  Comments  
28, 29, 30 
Relating to Article 3.5 
of the Agreement on 
Import Licensing 
Procedures 
Revised language which was 
discussed at the formal meeting held 
in March. 
work on these proposals 
still far from complete 
13 
relating to Article XVIII 
of the GATT 1994 
Revised language which was 
discussed at the formal meeting held 
in March.  
24, 25  
Relating to the SPS 
Agreement. 
Chairman had held several rounds 
of informal discussions. 
Discussions were based on earlier 
small group discussions that were 
held in May 
The delegations of China 
and Egypt had put forward 
some suggested language 
on these proposals which 
had provided a basis for 
future discussions. 
79  
Relating to the 
Agreement on SPS 
measures 
More work was needed and the 
Chairman promised to continue 
informal consultations on that 
proposal.  
 
In proposals 24 and 25, Members continued to face some difficulty in finding a right 
balance between predictability on the one hand, and automaticity on the other. Members 
needed to continue their work and although they had made progress, it was not going to 
be easy to find a balance.  On proposal No. 79, Members had made some progress in 
terms of gaining a better understanding what the proponents were seeking. Still, the Chair 
was to continue consulting on that proposal although he understands that the proponents 
were considering revising the proposal and coming up with alternate language in the form 
of a decision-making text.  The discussions at the informal, small group meeting proved 
to be productive, but there is clearly more work to be done. 
The CTD Special Session July 2006 report also indicates considerable divergences on 
the remaining nine proposals (Table 2) – for these, Members have not yet been able to 
prepare any revised or alternative texts, which was not a simple question of drafting or 
semantics. The divergences were on substance and there had to be convergence on the 
basic ideas before Members could engage in textual discussions.  
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Table 2. Proposals in which considerable work is required  to reach convergence 
Proposal No. Area  
14 on  Article XVIII:A of the GATT 1994 
22  on the Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations under the GATT 1994 
77   on the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II.1 (B) of the GATT 1994 
78 on the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of GATT 94  
82, 83 on the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade  
85 on the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures   
86, 87  on the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 1994.     
  
For that to happen, Members, and more particularly the proponents, were asked to reflect 
and engage in bilateral and informal consultations.  It was important to come up with 
clear recommendations by the December deadline. The Chair had expressed optimism 
that as Members reflected on the larger process, they would be able to continue engaging 
in consultations.   
The issue of predictability of outcome versus automaticity in the granting of flexibility 
has been a contentious one, according to the CTD SS report. Unless Members can strike a 
balance between the two it will be difficult to make progress.  Some Members have also 
raised questions regarding the utilization of some of the provisions the proponents are 
seeking to strengthen.  In their view, they do not see the justification in seeking to amend 
provisions that have not caused practical problems. The proponents have however 
reiterated that paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration calls for all S&D 
provisions to be strengthened, not just those that have proved to be problematic in their 
implementation and utilization. Members have been encouraged to continue with the 
meeting to narrow their differences. 
In the discussions on the Agreement-specific proposals, the LDCs have continued to 
stress the importance they attach to a quick and effective implementation of the duty-free 
quota-free (DFQF) market access decision adopted in Annex F at Hong Kong.  The 
LDCs have formally tabled two submissions in the Committee, one on rules of origin and 
the other on market access.13  The paper on the rules of origin points to the need for the 
DFQF decision to be accompanied by a single set of simple rules of origin and makes 
reference to the LDCs' preferred criteria for conferring origin.  The paper on market 
                                                 
13 TN/CTD/W/30 and W/31 respectively. 
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access points to how the LDCs would like to see the DFQF market access decision 
implemented. It urges Members, including developing country Members declaring 
themselves to be in a position to do so, to make their positions known as early as 
possible, on how they intend to implement the decision.  
In the preliminary discussions that have taken place, Members, while reiterating their 
commitment towards implementing the decision, have sought certain clarifications on the 
two papers.  Some Members have expressed the view that further work on the DFQF 
decision should be undertaken in the Regular Session of the CTD, and not in the Special 
Session.  However, the LDCs have maintained their position that further work to set out 
the means by which Members will implement this decision should be carried out in the 
Special Session of the CTD.  It has been suggested that questions and clarifications on the 
two submissions, as well as any responses to them, be put in writing.  Discussions on this 
issue will continue at the next meeting of the Special Session. At the same time, 
Members, particularly the key stakeholders, have been argued to continue their bilateral 
consultations with each other.   
As for the proposals referred to other bodies (Category II proposals), Members were 
informed at the formal meeting held on 7 April 2006 that progress on the proposals has 
not been forthcoming. In some cases, this had been due to a lack of engagement amongst 
Members.  The proponents remain concerned about the lack of progress on these 
proposals and have supported the suggestion made by some other Members that these 
proposals should be addressed in dedicated meetings of the different bodies. 
The cross-cutting issues were considered in the formal meeting held on 7 July 2006.  
In the discussions that have been held, Members have generally emphasised the 
importance of a Monitoring Mechanism.  While a number of elements have been 
mentioned in the context of the cross-cutting issues, it is clear that the Monitoring 
Mechanism is viewed by many as an important step in the continuing review of the 
effectiveness and operationalization of the S&D provisions.  Members have stressed the 
need to reach an understanding on the scope of the Mechanism and have agreed that 
further discussions on the Monitoring Mechanism take place in informal meetings.  To 
facilitate these discussions, and at the request of Members, the WTO Secretariat has 
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circulated a compilation of all the earlier proposals made on the Monitoring Mechanism.14 
If we are to make progress on this issue, Members themselves need to clarify their 
thoughts and ideas as to what they expect from a Monitoring Mechanism.  
 
What next?   
When the negotiating process starts again, Members intend to continue the text-based 
discussion with a view to making clear recommendations on all the remaining 
Agreement-specific proposals.  The aim would be to build convergence on as many 
proposals as possible, and construct a package of proposals that will bring this long-
standing issue to a closure. Meanwhile, the Chair of the CTD promises to continue to 
coordinate with the Chairpersons of the WTO bodies to which the Category II proposals 
have been referred. 
  
5 Conclusion and recommendation 
The current round of trade negotiations, the Doha Development Round does not yet 
deserve the epithet of a “development round” from the evidence so far. Developed 
countries have relegated on their promises to redress the imbalances—the challenges 
faced by poor countries and the inequities generated by previous rounds of trade 
negotiations. The Doha has failed to deliver on S&D. The Doha mandate was an 
opportunity for developing countries to push some of the S&D provisions closer to their 
expectations, by strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and 
operational – and to the extent possible, to change some ‘best-endeavour language’ into 
mandatory obligations. This has not happened. Given the stalemate, developing countries 
need to have a very honest discussion (among themselves) on issue of differentiation and 
graduation. Recognizing that economic and social conditions vary across countries, one 
option would be to tailor different types of S&D measures to specific circumstances and 
needs of developing countries on the basis of their levels of development. 
 
  
                                                 
14 JOB(06)/229 dated 25 July 2006. 
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Annex 
 
 
 88 
Total no. of  proposals 
submitted in the Special Session 
   
 38 
Proposals referred to other 
bodies 
(Cat II) 
   
          
 
50 
Proposals in the Special Session 
(Cat I + Cat III) 
     
27 
Agreed to in principle 
as part of package of 
28 proposals 
   
          
 
23 
Proposals remaining in the Special 
Session     
5 
LDC proposals agreed 
to in Hong Kong 
   
          
 
18 
Proposals remaining with the 
Special Session   
 2 
Proposals on the ATC 
(Terminated) 
   
          
 
16 
8 are from Cat I  and  8 are from Cat III. 
11 are by the African Group & 5 by 
other developing countries (dc's) 
       
         
8 
Remaining Category I Proposals 
(5 African Group & 3 other 
developing countries) 
  
 
 8 
Remaining Category III  
proposals 
 (6 African Group & 2 other 
developing countries) 
     
 
 
 
